Perhaps the biggest canard perpetrated in the last 50 years—up there with the capitalist mantra of “a rising tide lifts all boats,” the Easter Bunny, and the ubiquitous promise that “I’ll respect you in the morning,” the Bush administration's certitude that the Middle East could easily be primed and programmed to witness a transformation from rabid, autocratic authoritarian regimes (with the secular military-ruled ones being the most amenable to Western interests) to fairy-tale democracies is an illustration of recent dementia. Actually, to be fair, there has been a long-running debate within social science generally (and political science more specifically) as to how democracy forms and, moreover, whether or not it can be exogenously conditioned (i.e., forced from abroad). Within International Relations Theory one of the most expounded premises is that of “democratic peace theory”—that democratic states are much less likely to engage in war with other democracies. Historically this argument finds its roots in the works of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” but its contemporary variant wields substantially more sword than pen. Indeed, the Bush administration is perhaps the most outspoken of this contingent, harnessing it for their own particular agenda. For our purposes, as we American taxpayers underwrite a project carried out in our name, it is important that we recognize the resulting tradeoffs. In fact, a careful measurement of the pursuit of democratic transformation of the Middle East has incurred significant costs. Iraq, often acknowledged as the center of gravity in the war on terrorism, is an utter disaster. Afghanistan, after making brief progress in albeit truncated democracy and stillborn development, was headed in a better direction that it has in over 20 years. But gains in Afghanistan were summarily frittered away in the past three years as the Bush administration’s obsession with Iraq steered crucial resources away. Neo-Neanderthals in the Making of US Policy in Iraq To get back to Plato’s cave, let’s look at the cavemen that have taken center-stage to lead the US into Iraq. (The moniker “neo-neanderthal” is not intended to stir any archealogists, merely to situate the mentality at work in this metaphorical cave.) At present Iraq is experiencing simmering civil war with elements of a transnational insurgency and imperial proxy forces. I marvel at the exercise in fantasy that disputes this. July was the most violent month yet for Iraqis, with approximately 100 fatalities a day as a result of political killings. Before continuing with a review of this canard, a quick update on where we are in the Iraq boondoggle as of today: - Iraqis killed: between 43,258-48,035.
- US soldiers killed: 2,686.
- US solider wounded: 19,910.
- Other coalition forces (e.g., UK) killed: 233.
- US funds spent on Iraq:
- Spent as of mid 2006: over $300 billion.
- Current rate: around $7billion/month, $240 million/day, or $10 million per hour.
- Neither of the above includes veterans benefits.
Back to why it’s a war and should be called as such. Essentially, war connotes a scale and scope of violence that suggest existential stakes. This is certainly the case, for what will happen in Iraq is shaping up as what will set the tone for global order for 21st century. When Saddam Hussein was in power this was not the case; while he is a psychopath, his capacity to unravel international institutions, shred a sense of global community, or even overthrow a neighboring regime was minimal at best. Hussein was a thug, but a relatively small fish. The chaos and fragmentation in international politics that has emerged in the wake of his ouster poses a much greater threat. Now for the cavemen—those true-believers that think the war was a great idea and is going well—the administration of President George W. Bush.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the US drove them out in January 1991. At the time then President George H.W. Bush considered overthrowing Saddam. His advisors at the time warned him against it. National Security Brent Scowcroft, a protégé of Henry Kissinger, indicated that such a policy was untenable: “At minimum, we’d be an occupier in a hostile land. Our forces would be sniped at by guerillas, and, once we were, how would we get out? What would be the rationale for leaving? I don’t like the term ‘exit strategy’ but what do you do with Iraq once you own it?” Colin Powell similarly shunned the idea, citing the rule commonly attributed to the retailer, Pottery Barn, “if you break it, you buy it.” Although there is much to detest about the foreign policy of the Bush I administration, its embrace of Realism prevented the US from becoming embroiled in a costly, unnecessary, and endless disaster. The build up to the second Gulf War began with the cavemen falsely connecting the Hussein regime to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On December 28, 2001 Tommy Franks begins planning. Once the build up of troops actually began, so did the manipulation of shadows on the cave wall. Vice President Dick Cheney dropped any pretense of where US policy was headed: “Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits for the region… Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of jihad. Moderates… would take heart, and our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced.”
--August 26, 2002 Donald Rumsfeld deserves an award for Orwellian doublespeak for crafting the immortal words: “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of weapons of mass destruction.” On March 20, 2003 the US attacked and from then until the infamous “mission accomplished” stage management on May 1, 140 soldiers had been killed, a small fraction of what was to come. So, what of the cavemen today? They need the cave more than ever. The best illustration of this is the Iraqi national government. We—the US; our tax dollars at work—installed it, we paid for it, and were killing people to keep it in power. Though one would never know from what President Caveman is telling us: “Earlier this week, I traveled to Baghdad to visit the capital of a free and democratic Iraq.”
--June 17, 2006 Why was he so ebullient? “Iraq’s new government has another able leader in Speaker Mashhadani… He rejects the use of violence for political ends. And by agreeing to serve in a prominent role in this new unity government, he’s demonstrating leadership and courage.”
--May 22, 2006 Who is Mashhadani? “He’s a fellow that had been put in prison by Saddam and, interestingly enough, put in prison by us. And he made a decision to participate in government.”
--June 17, 2006 Gee, that is interesting enough. But it might be too interesting to know why we, or even Saddam, put him in jail—he has been linked to Al Qaeda. So, what does Bush’s new, able, and courageous leader have to say for himself? “Some people say ‘we saw you beheading, kidnapping, and killing. In the end we even started kidnapping women who are our honor.’ These acts are not the work of Iraqis. I am sure that he who does this is a Jew and the son of a Jew.”
--July 13, 2006 And, where are the cavemen taking us? Two areas of US policy in Iraq—military efforts and training Iraqis—are worth evaluating. - US military effort: US troops are becoming fatigued and losing morale. Our forces have been deployed for a very long time by contemporary standards. Around 160,000 US troops are on the ground right now, many on their 4th and 5th tours of duty. A Marine lieutenant characterized our options as:
“We can lose in Iraq and destroy our army, or we can just lose.” - Training Iraqis: This fib has been floating around since at least mid-2003. First, not only has training been at a glacial pace but, second, the resulting military forces are questionable. Robert Pape, a political scientist, put it well,
“Thinking we could go in and produce a unified Iraqi army is like thinking you could go into the South after the Civil War and create an army of black and whites fighting side by side.” Beyond these political fractures, there is a third problem: the logistics and major firepower of these forces is contingent on US assistance. If the US left altogether, the military would fold within a month. Thus, the US military commitment (at least air support) will be prolonged. Finally, if the US, the most powerful military force ever in the history of the world, could not defeat the insurgency, how can this new patchwork force? And thus, we see the power of the cave. A vital component of seeing the world as it is is to understand how others would like to see it. In the case of Iraq, the war there will not end until the political leadership of the US changes; the Bush administration will forever interpret their struggle as redemption and all opposition as hatred. These oafish fantasies come at a significant price. Indeed the painful irony of the moment is that we demand others live by the realities of our cave, just as it is caving in all around us. We proselytize while we pollute, but the stench of the latter overpowers any sincerity that may have once inhabited the former. The Bush administration may dream that the authoritarian Middle East is emulating us to become more democratic, however, the harsh truth is that if we consider the ill will we have seeded and nurtured--civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; torture sanctified by legal mumbo-jumbo in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and various other secret prisons; and the shredding of civil liberties at home--the US has become much more like the exclusive and fanatic governments and movements we castigate, than our enemies have embraced our nobler political traditions. On the scorecard of regime change, the US has changed the Middle East very little, but the Middle East has changed the US greatly. Don’t forget to mention that to your local caveman before and certainly on this first Tuesday in November. |
